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ABSTRACT
We evaluate the impact of probabilistically-constructed digital iden-
tity data collected between Sep. 2017 and Dec. 2017, approximately,
in the context of Lookalike-targeted campaigns. The backbone of
this study is a large set of probabilistically-constructed “identities",
represented as small bags of cookies and mobile ad identifiers with
associated metadata, that are likely all owned by the same under-
lying user. The identity data allows to generate “identity-based”,
rather than “identifier-based”, user models, giving a fuller picture
of the interests of the users underlying the identifiers.
We employ off-policy evaluation techniques to evaluate the po-
tential of identity-powered lookalike models without incurring the
risk of allowing untested models to direct large amounts of ad
spend or the large cost of performing A/B tests. We add to histor-
ical work on off-policy evaluation by noting a significant type of
“finite-sample bias" that occurs for studies combining modestly-
sized datasets and evaluation metrics based on ratios involving rare
events (e.g., conversions). We illustrate this bias using a simulation
study that later informs the handling of inverse propensity weights
in our analyses on real data.
We demonstrate significant lift in identity-powered lookalikes
versus an identity-ignorant baseline: on average ∼70% lift in con-
version rate, CVR, with a concordant drop in cost-per-acquisition,
CPA. This rises to factors of ∼ (4−32)x for identifiers having lit-
tle data themselves, but that can be inferred to belong to users
with substantial data to aggregate across identifiers. This implies
that identity-powered user modeling is especially important in the
context of identifiers having very short lifespans (i.e., frequently
churned cookies). Our work motivates and informs the use of
probabilistically-constructed digital identities in the marketing con-
text. It also deepens the canon of examples in which off-policy
learning has been employed to evaluate the complex systems of the
internet economy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The portion of the world economy devoted to marketing has grown
much faster than the global economy itself. This is largely due to
the rise of digital connectivity and the subsequent application of
technologies that optimize the matching of brand messages with
consumers. While powerful in principle, a proliferation of devices
and maturation of web services has led to a complex and fractured
view of consumers’ interests, making it difficult to optimally match
messages with consumers in practice.
Many of the largest companies in the world have become large
precisely by solving this problem. They pair compelling free ser-
vices with terms-of-use that allow the collection and monetization
(via advertising) of vast amounts of rich personal data on large
pools of users. Such use of personal data obviously has privacy
implications and securing and guaranteeing the proper use of such
data has proven challenging in practice [3, 24, 29]. Given the tension
between i) the need for companies to effectively reach customers
and ii) the need to allow consumers options in terms of how their
data is collected and used, a significant opportunity exists in solving
this problem outside of this small set of massive platforms.
The synthesis of Probabilistic Digital Identity Data is one alter-
native solution to this problem. Here the idea is that sources of
relatively “thin" data coming mainly from the digital advertising
ecosystem1 can be used to build inferred “users" as collections of
identifiers2. This organization can then be used to estimate the
interests/behaviors of the “users" who can, in turn, be messaged via
their associated identifiers. As the name suggests, probabilistic digi-
tal identity data is created by leveraging statistical machine learning
and data mining techniques, a route which is much more techni-
cally difficult compared to the deterministic aggregation of user-
volunteered data around long lived identifiers (e.g., customerID).
The data used to build the probabilistic identities in this work was
1This data can be seen as a massive stream of relatively uninformative event tuples
(discussed later).
2By which we mean reset-able and often short-lived marketing identifiers like cookies
and mobile ad-IDs. We refer to these simply as “identifiers" in what follows.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
05
56
0v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  4
 Ja
n 2
01
9
passively collected and did not contain any information that would
directly identify an individual such as name, phone number, or
postal address. This kind of data is much less rich than the kinds of
information typically volunteered to OSNs, thus, on the one hand,
potentially lowering the risks associated with data breach/misuse,
while on the other hand necessitating significant modeling to pre-
dict even basic demographic estimates (age, gender, etc.).
While the usefulness of this data is conceptually intuitive to
marketers, the impact of this data is often not straightforward to
measure in practice. There are several different problem scopes for
which one can consider evaluating the impact. There is also the
issue of simply obtaining accurate estimates of effect size in the
context of such complex systems. Likely owing to these factors, the
authors know of no other work that has previously attempted to
carry out these measurements. We attempt to do this here.
In terms of scope, we focus our evaluation of the impact of iden-
tity data on the important case of lookalike-targeted campaigns.
Lookalike-targeting refers to the continual estimation of user in-
terests and subsequent messaging of users that closely resemble
those who have previously resonated with a given message. This
is an interesting place to focus not only because of the strategy’s
general importance in marketing, but also because its analysis
poses an intermediate level of difficulty3. To be concrete then, we
are interested in answering the following question: If we allowed
identity-powered user models to drive our lookalike targeting, instead
of identity-ignorant variants, what would be the change in perfor-
mance of the system? By identity-ignorant lookalike-targeting we
refer to systems based on user models that estimate the interests
of the underlying user using only the data that is associated to
a single identifier. Identity-powered systems, in contrast, model
users’ interests by aggregating data across all of the identifiers that
are inferred to belong to the same underlying user.
To answer this question we lean heavily on off-policy evaluation
[41]. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, we would like to avoid
a) the risk of putting untested models into production systems that
control large amounts of ad spend and b) the costs of performing
many A/B tests to tune/validate new models. To the latter point,
although A/B tests remain the gold standard for estimating the
causal impact of interventions in principle, many have noted the
often-impractical nature of carrying out these kinds of tests in
practice (e.g., [21, 26, 32]). Second, given that we will evaluate these
models “off-line", using only data that was previously collected by
an “on-line" model, it is important to correct a naive analysis to
account for the fact that the naive results are generally not the same
as would occur if the new model were actually allowed to make its
own decisions and collect its own data.
In the remainder of this paper, we will give a description of
the raw data and the probabilistic processing that produces the
identity data whose application we would like to assess the impact
of. We will then discuss and analyze identity-powered lookalike
targeting, using off-policy learning techniques to arrive at a reliable
comparison of identity-powered and identity-ignorant systems.
Finally, we discuss potential extensions of this work and conclude.
3The importance of identity in re-targeting campaigns is obvious, but the analysis
is not as interesting (amounting to a counting exercise), while an analysis for very
broadly-targeted Brand campaigns is probably too difficult to do convincingly here
due to the lack of signals to quantify the effects.
2 PROBABILISTIC DIGITAL IDENTITY DATA
The basic aim in generating probabilistic identity data is to organize
massive sets of identifiers into small clusters such that the identifiers
within a cluster are likely associated to the same human user. Note
in particular that the system cannot identify the devices or
any other facts associated to one particular individual, but
rather, it simply attempts to determine that all identifiers in
the cluster are likely owned by one person, and not two or
more people. From a technical perspective, the process involves
aspects of information retrieval (what pairs of identifiers are even
relevant to consider?), supervised learning (how likely is it that
these two identifiers belong to the same person?), unsupervised
learning (detecting users within a complex network of scored pairs
of identifiers) and user-modeling (given a user cluster, what can we
say about the user’s interests?).
We first discuss the raw data upon which probabilistic identity
data will be built, and then continue to discuss the processing logic
that actually builds it. Further detail can be found in [17].
2.1 Raw Data
The raw data used to build identities comes from the platforms that
power the digital advertising ecosystem. While this kind of data is
massive in scale4, it comes as a stream of relatively uninformative,
passively collected events. The signal-to-noise in such data falls well
short of that typically volunteered by users to platform services like
social networks, requiring significant processing to uncover even a
basic knowledge of the underlying users and their interactions.
The information inside of these events can be classified into
two broad categories: i) observational data, typically including an
identifier, timestamp and network address and ii) semantic data,
describing the content context of the event (typically an associated
content category5, demographic estimates for the user, etc.). The
identifiers associated to each event tuple are the cookies and/or
mobile advertising identifiers used in the advertising industry to
allow brands to reach consumers with their messaging. They are
user-resettable unique identifiers (generated as large strings by
cryptographic hashing algorithms). Active identifiers may thus
become inactive at any time, new identifiers may spawn at any time,
and many identifiers have a lifespan of only a single observation.
Given this kind of input data it is not even obvious which iden-
tifiers are associated to the same device, much less to the same
user or to users living in the same household. We now discuss a
probabilistic system that discovers this kind of identity structure
from this unstructured raw data.
2.2 Creating Identity Data
The system that estimates the underlying identity structure from
batches of raw data events consists of a chain of modules that are
repeatedly applied in each run to build up hierarchical levels of or-
ganization (devices as collections of identifiers, users as collections
of devices, households as collections of users). The basic compo-
nents of the chain are: i) pair discovery, ii) pair scoring and iii)
community detection.
4There are more than 100B of such events occurring daily across the globe.
5Like: entertainment->movies
2.2.1 Pair Discovery. The pair discovery step in the system is
an information-retrieval step used simply to control the scale of
what is processed by more expensive steps further downstream.
Pair discovery performs a TF-IDF-like [34] scoring of identifier co-
occurrences on bipartite identifier and “proxy" networks, where the
various proxy objects correspond to spatio-temporal localizations,
for example, an (IP address,date) tuple. A conservative cut on
this score allows the most relevant ∼100B pairs of identifiers to be
considered further.
2.2.2 Pair Scoring. In the pair scoring step supervised learning
algorithms are trained to score the pairs produced by pair discov-
ery according to obfuscated-deterministic labels. These labels are
constructed using identifier-handle linkages in which the handles
are obfuscated and typically refer to something like a hashed email.
We label pairs in which the same handle is linked to both identifiers
as +1’s, and those for which no handle is linked to both identifiers
as −1’s6. Given this, one can imagine that +1’s are pairs for which
someone can verify that the same email has been used on both
identifiers and −1’s are pairs for which we have failed to verify the
same. We do expect that our −1’s are erroneous at some rate simply
due to the imperfect knowledge of our label data providers and at-
tempt to source identifier-handle linkages from multiple providers
to reduce label errors that occur due to limited visibility.
Pair scoring, as a supervised learning task in exactly this context,
has been the subject of prior work termed as “cross-device” linkage
scoring. To date there have beenmultiple machine learning competi-
tions [1, 2] regarding techniques for estimating which ids likely be-
long to the same underlying user [7, 12, 23, 25, 30, 33, 40, 44, 46, 48],
among other works [39, 45, 47]. The features used in most pair
scoring models, include those in the system described here, in-
clude several classes: i) those regarding the behaviors of each of
the two objects in the pair in isolation ii) those having to do with
the patterns of interaction between these two objects and iii) a
featurization of the graph contexts in which this pair of objects is
embedded7. While features in ii) typically do the real heavy lifting,
features in iii) are particularly important for accurately scoring
pairs that do not already have a long history of interaction. While
there are a handful of models involved in producing the features
themselves, once produced we utilize an ensemble of boosted [14]
and bagged [6] trees to produce the final scores.
2.2.3 Community Detection. If one views the set of scored pairs
as a graph, this graph will be a web-scale complex network of
weighted undirected edges. The graph has an approximately power-
law degree distribution, small diameter and degree assortativity as
in many other datasets [35]. In particular, simply removing edges
with scores below some value will not reduce the graph into one
in which the connected components are plausible representations
of the true underlying users. For this we must apply a community
detection (CD) algorithm [13] to the graph of scored edges.
Given the scale of our graph, ∼10B vertices and ∼100B edges, the
set of CD algorithms and implementations that can be effectively
used is highly constrained. Perhaps the most scalable (and therefore
6Given that both identifiers have some handle/s attached. We label pairs in which
one/both identifiers have no handles as 0’s (this class composing the vast majority of
pairs in the system).
7For graph embedding methods, see a recent review [16] and the references therein.
most often used) massive CD algorithm is Label Propagation, LP
[42]. The extreme scalability of LP comes from its basis on a simple
heuristic rule to create communities, however, and relying on such
a rule has several downsides in our context: i) the basic rule leads
to low-quality communities as measured both by eye and by truth
data; ii) changing the basic rule is possible, but inconvenient as
a mapping between tweaks to the rule and the resulting changes
in performance is complex (one must reason about rules that may
lend toward some particular objective, check if they, in fact, do
improve this objective, etc.); iii) found communities are highly
unstable to small input graph changes (clusters have little overlap
in consecutive runs of the system).
To overcome these issues the system that produces the iden-
tity data described here implements a highly-distributed local Fit-
ness optimization procedure for its CD step that we term GFDC
(Generalized-Fitness-Driven Clustering). The algorithm is related
to many previous works [4, 9, 27, 28, 43], though differing substan-
tially in the definition of “Fitness” that is used. Historically, “Fitness”
has tended to refer to the well-known network modularity [36], or
to slight variants with free parameters [27, 28] or by addition of
other local network structural information [11]. For our purposes,
with a network built on noisy and incompletely-observed links,
pure modularity optimization does not always produce clusters
that plausibly represent underlying users. For GFDC we suppose
only that Fitness is a weighted sum of locally-calculable terms de-
scribing proposed communities. We use the Fitness function as
a way to not only drive toward higher modularity, but also, for
instance, to enforce desired behaviors like temporal smoothness [8]
or to provide Bayesian encouragement based on domain knowledge.
As an example of the latter case, we can add a term that describes
high-fitness user clusters as those in which there are about one
(rarely zero or two) phones. Such a term would appear alongside
a modularity term so that clusters having ten phones that might
be proposed by modularity optimization alone would be broken
down by the two-term definition of “Fitness” (provided the loss of
modularity in doing so is not too great).
The system uses Apache Giraph8 to run GFDC at the required
scale. The calculation proceeds in rounds, wherein each round a
random selection of vertices can decide to join any adjacent com-
munity based on a calculation of the changes in Fitness that would
result. The decision is greedy (vertices always choose the com-
munity that maximizes fitness) and myopic (vertices assume that
no other vertices will move, which is not the case). Despite this,
the flexibility of our definition of Fitness results in both greatly
increased precision at all recall values with respect to an LP bench-
mark (measured by pairwise labels described in subsection 2.2.2)
and clusters that are much more reasonable-looking and stable. Of
course, GFDC is also more expensive to run than LP, but given our
distributed implementation, not prohibitively so, even at this scale.
2.3 Probabilistic Identity Dataset
Given that probabilistic techniques are being employed on noisy,
incomplete, massive scale, dynamic data, we expect that any given
set of putative “identities" are afflicted with both Type-I errors
(two identifiers placed in the same cluster which are not actually
8http://giraph.apache.org/
Table 1: Statistics for some of the Identity datasets used in
this work.G1 (G8) is the operating point exhibiting the high-
est tolerance for FPs (FNs) thatwe consider here. Basic filters
have been applied to remove clusters that are not plausible
regular consumers (i.e., perhaps bots, etc.). Reported are fig-
ures for the number of users internationally and in the U.S.
market specifically as well as the median number of identi-
fiers per user and physical devices per user (US).
Dataset Global (M) US (M) ID/Usr (US) Dev./Usr (US)
G1 901 264 33 3
G8 602 176 5 1
associated with the same user) and Type-II errors (two identifiers
that are placed in two different clusters, even though they are
actually associated to the same user). Any practical implementation
of this technology allows tuning between the two ends of this
error spectrum (small/tight clusters with very few False Positives
(FP) and many False Negatives (FN) vs. large/fuzzy clusters with
very few FNs and many FPs) to address use-cases with varying
degrees of tolerance to the two types of error. In our system, after
users are produced in the CD step, we give each identifier a cluster
membership score based on simple measures of affinity calculated
on the input network. Cutting on this score “tunes” our user clusters
for a given FP/FN tolerance. In order to gauge the effect of this
choice on the measurements reported below we present results for
a handful of operating points along this spectrum of errors.
The identity datasets that we will use here have been created
based on events generated during the period Sep. 2017 - Dec. 2017.
After a basic cleaning to remove irregular-looking clusters the
whole set is of size ∼900M identities, composed of a total of ∼23B
advertising identifiers that were active at some time during this
period. Basic statistics describing our high-FP and high-FN identity
dataset endpoints are given in Table 1.
3 IDENTITY-POWERED LOOKALIKES
In this section, we first discuss lookalike systems in more detail. We
discuss the metrics that we will use to evaluate performance, data
preparation procedures specific to this analysis and features/models
employed to model users. We then turn to a detailed description of
our off-policy evaluation methodology. We define basic concepts,
lay out a simplified model of the larger system that allows to isolate
the impact of identity and, finally, discuss a novel kind of bias that
arises in the presence of rare-events and finite datasets.
3.1 System, Models, Metrics and Data
The job of a lookalike targeting system is to continually execute:
i) collect historical impressions and conversions associated with
a given campaign, ii) learn to discriminate between previously
converted users and random users, iii) rank non-converted users
according to their similarity with the previously converted group
and iv) expose highly-ranked users to the campaign message by
bidding appropriately to serve them impressions. As this loop is
repeatedly iterated the pool of previously converted users grows
Table 2: Basic statistics of the campaign data used here.
Quoted for each campaign (Cmp) are the impression scale
(Imp), conversion rate for IDs in and out of the production
whitelist (CVRin and CVRout, resp.), and descriptions of the
campaign market vertical and call to action.
Cmp Imp(M) CVRin/out(%) Vertical Action
A 1.21 0.049/0.016 Home Security Engagement
B 7.27 0.014/0.010 Home Goods Form Fill
C 8.18 0.032/0.009 Arts/Crafts Purchase
D 0.80 0.053/0.009 Wireless Form Fill
E 1.46 0.018/0.009 Streaming Video Form Fill
F 0.45 0.027/0.008 Solar Land’g Pg.
G 3.71 0.046/0.005 Live Music Purchase
H 5.43 0.008/0.005 Real Estate Form Fill
and the system continually refines its ability to message users that
particularly resonate with the campaign.
In our system 10M highly-ranked identifiers are whitelisted for
rather aggressive bidding, while all identifiers are also potentially
impressed in less specifically-targeted channels. This is important
in the context of off-policy evaluation: all identifiers have some
chance to be impressed, so the support in covariate space is not
completely collapsed onto that of the whitelisted group. We use
gradient-boosted tree ensembles[14, 22] to learn to discriminate
previously-converted users from random users. The features we use
are primarily semantic features based on the content associatedwith
the user’s events and the basic activity patterns of the identifiers
composing the “user”.
Albeit basic in terms of machine learning algorithm and features,
the aforementioned system serves as a qualified testing ground
for the purpose of evaluating our identity data: The only differ-
ence between the identity-powered and identity-ignorant models
is whether or not the same set of features is aggregated across all
of the identifiers inferred to be associated to the same underlying
user. Moreover, due to the generic nature of our system, we expect
that the effectiveness of identity data found here would generalize
well to other similar but more sophisticated targeting systems.
We focus on CVR as our measure of the performance difference
between the two models as we observe similar results (both quali-
tatively and quantitatively) for CPA as we do for CVR. We filter the
data such that only the first conversions and impressions occurring
before the first conversion are counted for a given brand/user his-
tory, avoiding potential confusion caused by multiple conversions.
We chose a set of eight campaigns to include in the study, which
could be useful in understanding the heterogeneity of our results.
While the brands involved will remain anonymous, we note that
the campaigns were chosen based on several criteria: i) impression
and/or conversion scale large enough to reasonably study, though
ranging from small to large within that criterion, ii) broad targeting
(geographical region, demographics, etc.), and iii) collectively rep-
resenting a variety of products and calls to action. Basic statistics
describing the campaign data are provided in Table 2.
In all analyses below the identity data used was created based on
events that were generated before these campaigns were run. This
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Figure 1: Approximate factorization of our system bidding
logic as concerns the Lookalike Model. We study a direct
change to the variable L, which indirectly changes the vari-
able B. Both R andW remain approximately unchanged.
eliminates the possibility of any leakage of the campaign results
via the structure of the identity data itself.
3.2 Off-Policy Evaluation
Naively, to gauge the impact of identity on user-modeling, one
simply trains two lookalike models (identity-powered and identity-
ignorant versions) in an offline fashion, makes predictions about
which users will convert, waits for the production (on-line) system
to collect new data and compares their ability to predict which users
did eventually convert. This does not answer our real question of
interest: if we were to use either of these models in place of the
production system (part of which includes its own on-line lookalike
model that does not use identity data), how would the results differ?
Newmodels would evaluate users, adjust bids and serve impressions
differently than the online model. To overcome this bias one should
re-weight the data collected by the production system to bring
estimates into closer accord with what would be expected from
alternative systems.
3.2.1 Inverse-Propensity Weighting. A procedure which is com-
monly used to do this correction is importance weighting [19] or
inverse-propensity weighting [18] (“IPW", in the case where propen-
sity models are being used to work in high-dimensional covariate
spaces). In equations this can be seen as a change of measure on
covariate space:
Y =
∫
®x
yP(®x) and Y ∗ =
∫
®x
yP∗(®x) =
∫
®x
y
(
P∗(®x)
P(®x)
)
P(®x), (1)
where Y and Y ∗ are the outcome quantity of interest (CVR) esti-
mated under the on-line or off-line policy, respectively (Y ∗ being the
main subject of our interest here). ®x is an example point in covariate
space. P(®x) and P∗(®x) are the sampling distributions representing
systems leveraging the on-line and off-line models, respectively.
For our purposes, P(®x) will be defined as the probability that an ad
request represented by covariates ®x is impressed under the on-line
bidding policy. The estimates for Y and Y ∗ is then
Yˆ =
1
n
∑
i∼P
yi and Yˆ ∗ =
1
n
∑
i∼P
(
P∗(®xi )
P(®xi )
)
yi =
1
n
∑
i∼P
wiyi , (2)
where
∑
i∼P means summing over data points i that are sampled
from distribution P . Then, we see that estimating the quantity of
interest Yˆ ∗ requires up- or down-weighting examples collected
under the on-line policy according to weights w = P∗(®x)/P(®x).
Examples that would be more commonly seen if the off-line model
had been used to collect data rather than the on-line model that
was actually used, i.e., when P∗(®x) > P(®x), are thus up-weighted
(and vice-versa).
Given that we are changing only one piece in a larger complex
system, one can usefully employ a structural model [37, 49] to
factorize the larger P(®x) and P∗(®x) distributions such that many
of the factors cancel in their ratio. In our bidder, the influence of
the Lookalike model can be isolated using the following Markov
factorization (corresponding structural model pictured in Fig. 1):
P(®x) = P(R,L,B,W ) (3)
≈ P(W |B,R) · P(B |L,R) · P(L|R) · P(R) (4)
Both of the factors P(R) and P(W |B,R) will cancel out in the ra-
tio, corresponding to the statements that i) The characteristics of
requests that pass basic targeting criteria for some campaign (“qual-
ified requests") is independent of the internal model logic that we
will apply in our system and ii) conditioned on the the request R and
the bid amount B, the external auction is isolated from knowledge
of what model we applied to come up with that bid amount. Both
of these statements are approximate, but expected to hold quite
well. The former is true up to changes in the nature of internal
competition between the various campaigns in our own system,
and the latter is true up to changes in the auction environment as
external competitors adjust to changes in our bidding behavior.
In contrast to P(R) and P(W |B,R), we do not expect the factors
P(B |L,R) and P(L|R) to cancel out in the ratio. The factor P(L|R)
is precisely what we are changing when we change the Lookalike
model, it is the probability of a given user being placed on the
Lookalike whitelist with respect to some campaign. Getting on
this list depends primarily on the model score (the part we will
change by using identity-powered features rather than identity-
ignorant features), but also secondarily on seemingly un-involved
covariates regarding user activity level and behavior patterns9. As
there are a handful of such covariates, wewill employ simple logistic
regression models to estimate P(L|S,X ), P∗(L|S∗,X ), where X ⊂ R
are activity/behavioral covariates and S and S∗ are identity-ignorant
and identity-powered Lookalike scores, respectively.
The bid-amount term, P(B |L,R), is also interesting to consider.
In our system bid amounts are largely influenced by feedback of
outcome values (i.e., bids tomorrow are a function of CVR and CPA
today, among other considerations), so, strictly speaking, there is
a feedback loop that should be included in our structural model
which would invalidate its use in causal studies [38]. Given this, we
perform two analyses, where we set the ratio of these factors as:
i) P
∗(B |L,R)
P(B |L,R) = 1 and, ii)
P∗(B |L,R)
P(B |L,R) =
P∗(L|S∗,X )
P(L|S,X ) . (5)
For the first case we set the ratio = 1 (canceling the bid term), which
will give estimates for the performance that we should expect in
the time before which feedback is incorporated10, or in the case
where feedback is not the primary driver of bid prices. In the second
case, we make the following series of assumptions: that the ratio
of the bid amounts would scale with the ratio of CVRs for the two
models, which itself would scale with the ratio of the two propensity
scores. Of course, both of these choices are rough approximations,
but useful inasmuch as we expect the first to under-estimate and
the second to over-estimate the true steady-state IPWs. We thus
9We do not consider all possible users for Lookalike whitelisting, the considered set
partly depends on how active the users are, etc.
10In this case, this is ∼days, as conversion feedback is sparse and latent data.
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Figure 2: The sampling distributions P and P∗ in the simu-
lation study are shown on the left. The histogram of the re-
sulting IPW is displayed in the center panel, which qualita-
tively matches the histogram from real data shown on the
right. Conversions are plotted as red bars on the x-axis in
bothhistograms, showing the regions inwhich they are rare.
expect the true performance of a deployed Lookalike model to lie
somewhere between the two estimates obtained in what follows.
An important consideration in off-policy evaluation is in how
to treat examples falling in regions of support non-overlap, i.e.,
examples near which the IPW,w , explodes. In such regions a naive
weighting by the IPW implies that a few examples dominate the
estimation, greatly increasing the variance of our estimates. Typical
heuristic solutions trade off most of the variance at the cost of some
bias. Here we use weight truncation [31], wT (w) = min(w,w0),
where weights are truncated as they cross a threshold w0. While
many other works [15, 20] have focused on comparing a wide vari-
ety of counterfactual estimators (e.g., weight dropping, truncation,
model-based and doubly-robust variants) we opted not to do this
here, as our main focus is on the evaluation of the impact of identity
data, and as we were not able to follow up with the kind of extensive
A/B testing that would be required to definitively judge the relative
performance of various estimators. We did do our analysis twice,
once using the weight truncation mentioned above, and once using
weight dropping [5], where weights are set to zero upon crossing a
thresholdw0, finding estimates that were consistent withwT and
of similar variance (these are omitted for clarity in what follows).
3.2.2 Finite-Sample Bias. Besides the bias/variance trade-off
that usually determinesw0, in our analysis we encountered another
kind of bias. The issue here is caused by a confluence of factors:
the sparse nature of conversions, the modestly-sized (in terms of
conversions) campaign datasets used here, and the importance of
the upper tail of the IPW distribution. Given the sharply falling tail
of the IPW distribution, for some regionw0 > ws one statistically
expects only a small amount of impressions and thus very few
conversions, even though the CVR in that regime may well be quite
high. This regime of w0 > ws is pertinent because it is precisely
where we hope the new model to improve upon the old, yet we
could be counting thousands of highly-weighted impressions and
the estimated CVR collapses to unreasonably low values. We refer
to this source of bias as finite-sample bias.
A simple simulation study illustrates this effect. It is also a nice
sandbox in which practitioners can learn basic rules for settingw0
in analyses on real data. Here we suppose a population of identifiers
indexed simply by x ∈ [0, 1]. Each member of the population has an
inherent CVR, y(x), which is linear in x for simplicity. We suppose
that the production and new models have true propensity functions
2
3
4
5
CV
R*
(×
10
4 )
CVR * ( )
CVR * (w0)
500K
50K
10 1 100 101 102 103 104 105
w0
0
1
2
Er
ro
r 
(×
10
4 )
500K 50K Trunc
Figure 3: Top, CVR∗ as a function of IPW threshold w0, is
calculated (squares) from two batches of datasets of 50K
(green) and 500K samples (blue), and compared to infinite-
sample CVR∗(w0) (solid black) and ground truth CVR∗(∞) (i.e.
no truncation, black dotted). Bottom, the total error (solid
color) is decomposed into the finite-sample bias (spheres),
truncation bias (solid black) and standard deviation (dash-
dot). The heuristic choice of w0, Eqn. 7, is shown as vertical
bars on the x-axis.
of P(x) and P∗(x), respectively, that are Beta distributions (illus-
trated in Fig. 2), with parameters chosen to match the qualitative
behaviors of our actual data, especially in the high-IPW tail11.
Given this setup we can estimate CVR∗ both analytically (c.f.
Eqn. 1) and numerically (c.f. Eqn. 2), allowing a knowledge of
infinite-sample and finite-sample results, respectively, and thus
a decomposition of the overall bias, Biasall, into truncation, BiasT,
and finite-sample, BiasFS, components as following:
Biasall = ĈVR
∗(w0) − CVR∗(∞)
BiasT = CVR∗(∞) − CVR∗(w0) (6)
BiasFS = Biasall − BiasT
In other words, the overall bias is the difference between the es-
timated ĈVR∗(w0) and the ground truth CVR∗(∞); the infinite-
sample truncation bias equals the ground truth minus the true
CVR∗ with truncation, analytically calculated by integrating Eqn. 1
over the range [0,w0(x)]; the finite-sample bias is the leftover bias
after accounting for the truncation.
The one term left in Eqn. 6, ĈVR∗(w0), needs to be numerically
calculated. Here, 1) one dataset i with 50K or 500K impressed identi-
fiers is sampled from the known Beta distribution P(x). 2) It is then
boostrapped 100 times, allowing us to calculate the median and
variance of ĈVR∗ at differentw0 for this dataset i in the same way a
normal practitioner would do. Note that, without the knowledge of
the underlying probability distribution P , the estimates ĈVR∗(w0)i
whenw0 ≫ 1 would not be robust due to the relatively large vari-
ance in the modest-sized data, and the variances Var(w0)i would
be underestimated from bootstrapping[10]. In order to obtain a
robust and accurate estimate of ĈVR∗(w0) for the bias breakdown
11The actual distributions were: P (x ) ∼ B(2.5, 2.5) and P ∗(x ) ∼ B(0.5, 4.5).
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Figure 4: Estimates for the lift in CVR for lookalike-targeted campaigns due to the use of identity data. In the left panel, results
by-campaign and averaged over campaigns for theG1 (high-FP) identity dataset. On the right, campaign-averaged results for a
series of identity datasets ranging between theG1 andG8 endpoints. Naive estimates are presented along with corrected results
using overall weights ofwT orw2T , according to the choice of bid-factor (c.f. Eqn. 5).
(Eqn. 6), and to correctly quantify the variance so that the total
error (Bias2all + Var)
1
2 can be measured, step 1) and 2) are repeated
100 times, and the median of these ĈVR∗(w0)i and Var(w0)i are
used as ĈVR∗(w0) and its variance.
The results from the simulation study are shown in Fig. 3. We ob-
serve the expected trade-off between truncation bias at loww0 and
variance at higherw0. At even higherw0 there is the regime with
large finite-sample bias (larger for smaller datasets, as expected).
Practitioners with real datasets may expect to see an estimator
whose variance rises continually withw0 and whose mean plateaus,
but this is not the case: one observes the variance rising until there
are no more conversions with higher IPW, around w0 ≈ 100, at
which point ĈVR∗ collapses (with compulsory decrease in variance)
and eventually falls significantly below the ground truth. Obviously,
the optimal choice forw0 is to minimize the total error shown in
the lower panel in Fig. 3. But this is not visible to a practitioner with
a single real dataset and no knowledge of the underlying model.
We, therefore, look for a simple heuristic that yields approximately
optimal results in our toy model.
This choice should obviously depend on both the campaign size
and nominal CVR. We find the following heuristic to provide good
results in simulation studies:
Pr (k>w0 ≤ 5;N>w0 , Y¯ ) = 1 − δ , (7)
where k>w0 is the number of conversions and N>w0 the number of
impressions falling in the IPW regionw > w0, Y¯ is the nominal CVR,
computed as the average in the production system. The number of
conversions thus follows a binomial distribution with parameters
N>w0 and Y¯ and we set δ = 0.05 so that we start truncating weights
where we expect ≤ 5 conversions at IPWs this extreme with 95%
probability. This choice is illustrated in Fig. 3 with vertical bars
on the x-axis, which does a reasonable job at minimizing the total
error for datasets of both sizes. We use this heuristic to choosew0
in what follows.
3.3 Results
The basic results of our lookalike analysis are presented in Fig. 4,
where we present campaign-specific and campaign-averaged results
for the high-FP endpoint identity dataset G1 as well as campaign-
averaged results for identity datasets interpolating between ourG1
(high-FP) and G8 (high-FN) endpoints.
Though the variance of our estimates is not negligible, we ob-
serve (Fig. 4, left) that the identity-powered lookalike system ap-
pears to show a significant ∼70% lift on average12. There are some
campaigns for which the naive and corrected results largely agree.
We find that these are generally those inwhich the identity-powered
and identity-ignorant lookalike whitelists have significant overlap.
In most cases where naive and corrected results significantly dis-
agree the corrected results are larger, evidently showing that re-
gions in covariate space that are preferred by the identity-powered
model, are preferentially those with higher CVR.
Results comparing different identity datasets are also interest-
ing (Fig. 4, right). Here we have some logical expectations for the
shape of the lift curve: at very high FNs we should have very small
clusters and the lift relative to identity-ignorant approaches should
approach 1 (no lift); moving in the opposite direction we expect
lift to rise as useful information is included, and then degrade once
clusters become so large that the information being included is
mostly noise. We indeed observe an increase in relative lift from
nearly 1 (no lift) at theG8 endpoint to a plateau with a higher lift as
we approach the G1 endpoint here, suggesting that our G1 dataset,
although admitting the most FPs of any here, has not reached the
point of significant degradation. Unfortunately, our system does
not produce identity datasets with higher FP rates than G1, which
we plan to investigate in the future.
An even more interesting finding is presented in Fig. 5. Here we
show that the advantage of the identity-powered system over the
identity-ignorant system is indeed much higher where it is logi-
cally expected to be: when the observations on each identifier are
infrequent, but where more information from the other identifiers
associated to the same user can supplement. To produce Fig. 5 we
define a boolean filter that is a good proxy for these statements:
fi (qcut) =
(
obsi < Qobs(1 − qcut)
) ∧ (clsi > Qcls(qcut)), (8)
where obsi and clsi are the number of observations on identifier
i and the cluster size of the associated cluster, Qobs and Qcls are
12This is a number bracketed by thewT - andw2T -style off-policy corrected estimates
(c.f. Eqn. 5), averaged across campaigns. The Naive estimate of the same had lift ∼30%.
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Figure 5: CVR ratio of identity-powered to identity-ignorant
lookalike targeting for identifiers with fi (qcut)= 1 as a func-
tion ofqcut (c.f. Eqn. 8). Presented areNaive andwT orw2T cor-
rected results. Insets illustrate the limiting cases of low and
high qcut, where most information is contained on few long-
lived identifiers and where information is spread across a
variety of short-lived identifiers, resp. Results are averaged
over campaigns and identity dataset G1 is used.
quantile functions for observations and user cluster sizes13. fi (qcut)
can thus be used as a boolean filter for including identifier i given a
quantile cut qcut. From Fig. 5, we observe that the CVR lift increases
strongly with qcut, reaching values in the ∼(4−32)x range for the
extreme case qcut = 90% (amounting to ∼ 1% of identifiers in our
data). The implication is that identity data is especially important
in the limit of frequently-churned identifiers.
4 DISCUSSION
In this work, we investigated the effectiveness of probabilistically-
constructed digital identity data in lookalike-targeted ad campaigns.
This data takes the form of hierarchical collections of identifiers,
represents identities at a variety of resolutions such as physical
devices and users, and are mined from a stream of unstructured and
thin event tuples using probabilistic machine learning approaches.
We employed off-policy evaluation techniques and a careful han-
dling of the bias that occurs in finite-sized datasets, in order to
accurately estimate the lift due to identity data in identity-powered
systems above the baseline performance of identity-ignorant vari-
ants. Our results suggest a significant lift overall and lend guidance
in terms of tuning the identity data being used for this purpose.
The lift due to using identity data appears particularly large where
it logically should: in the limit where observations associated to an
underlying user are spread across a wide number of identifiers that
must be inferred to belong to that user (via identity data).
There are many directions in which this work could be fruitfully
extended. Perhaps most obvious is that it would be good to compare
these results to those coming from online A/B tests. Unfortunately,
13For reference, ∼98% of previously-converted users and ∼87% of users considered for
Lookalike whitelisting map to non-trivial (multi-vertex) clusters in our base identity
dataset G1 .
this was not possible here because the advertising platform col-
lecting the campaign data became unavailable soon after the data
was collected. It would also be interesting to bolster the analysis by
including many more campaigns and presenting a fuller analysis
of the heterogeneity of the results across campaigns. Here we did
not observe a consistent pattern with respect to campaign-specific
factors (e.g., call-to-action-type, etc.) among the eight campaigns
studied.
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